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Abstract: In the kaplanian framework the indexical’s referent and content are determined by
its  linguistic  meaning  and contextual  factors.  Each context  c  has at  least  an  agent,  time,
location,  and possible world associated with it -  <a,  t,  l,  w,  .  .  .  >. The ‘character’  of an
expression is a function from possible contexts of use to contents. Considering that a context
is a ‘possible occasion of use’ of an expression, the agent turns out to be an abstract feature of
the semantic framework, a contextual parameter filling the argument of the character, giving
us the referent of the indexical, and, as such, is logically distinct from the notion of an utterer.
But in the kaplanian framework the agent and the utterer will always be identical and the
referent of ‘I’ will always be the utterer. The same happens to ‘here’ and ‘now’; in each case
the character of the indexical is a function from a contextual parameter to the referent of the
expression. An example of logical truth peculiar to indexicals is the sentence ‘I am here now’,
since no utterance can take place in a context whose agent is not in its location in its time. In
this paper I examine three well-known cases that seem to cast doubt on the notion that a
speaker is always at the place of the utterance when the utterance occurs. Then I give some
examples  produced  in  Second  Life  environment,  which  cannot  be  handled  correctly  by
evaluating the expression at issue with respect to the traditional view. Finally I conclude this
paper by claiming that particular kinds of utterances produced in virtual environments (VE)
break with the logical truth status of ‘I am here now’.
Introduction
The study of indexicals can shed light not only to general theories of meaning, but also
can  bring  some  insight  into  matters  such  as  belief,  knowledge,  first-person  perspective,
personal  identity  and  consciousness.  The  expression  ‘index’  was  introduced  by  Charles
Sanders  Peirce  (1935:  2.274-2.308,  in  Brinck,  1997).  He  maintained  that  an  indexical  is
characterised by standing in a contiguous relation in time and space to which it indicates. It
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depends on the existence of its object to function as a sign. Peirce held that demonstratives,
pronouns and proper names are indices.  According to him,  linguistic  indexicals  focus the
attention of the hearer to an object common to the experience of both speaker and hearer.
Thus the indexicals establish a ‘real connection’ between the hearer and object, and they do so
without describing the object. Kaplan doesn’t include proper names in the class of indexicals.
As opposed to proper names, indexicals do not hold on their objects over time. Rather, their
reference is momentary, tied up with the instance of use. ‘I’ uttered by a no longer indicates a
when uttered by b. ‘Now’ uttered at t1 does not still indicate t1 at t2 and ‘here’ uttered at l1 does
not still indicate l1 at l2.
In the kaplanian framework (1989) the indexical’s referent and content are determined
by its linguistic meaning and contextual factors. Each context  c  has at least an agent, time,
location, and possible world associated with it - <a, t, l, w, . . . >. The component of meaning
that  he  calls  ‘content’  is  a  function  from possible  worlds to  referents,  or  in  a  kaplanian
vocabulary,  a function from circumstances  of evaluation to an appropriate  extension.  The
content of a given utterance of a sentence is the proposition expressed, but parts of sentences
(names, predicates, indexicals, etc.) also have contents. The evaluation of the content of an
expression in  a  given circumstance  yields  its  extension  in  that  circumstance  (1989:  501).
Hence, the evaluation of a proposition yields a truth-value, the evaluation of a singular term
yields an object and the evaluation of an n-place predicate is a set of ordered n-tuples.
The ‘character’ of an expression is a function from possible contexts of use to contents.
It is what ‘determines the content in varying contexts’ (1989: 505), e.g. the character of ‘I’
can be represented as a function, which takes as input the contextual parameter, the agent, and
returns  as  value  the  referent.  The  ‘character’  aims  to  capture  the  linguistic  meaning  of
indexical expressions.
The reference and content of a true demonstrative (e.g. ‘that’) in a context depends on
the speaker’s intentions like the one manifested by a pointing gesture. But the reference and
content of a pure indexical is ‘automatic’ (Perry, 2001), they don’t depend on the speaker’ s
intentions. The content of ‘I’ with respect to a context c is the agent of c; the content of ‘here’
is the location of c; the content of ‘now’ is the time of c.
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Kaplan’s  logic  of  demonstratives  (LD)  involves  indexicals,  demonstratives,  tense
operators, contexts of utterance, agents, positions, times, and the distinction between character
and content,  but despite the requirement  of a much more powerful logical  apparatus  than
simple [quantified]  modal  logic  (Zalta,  1988), Kaplan argues for two ‘obvious’ principles
(1989: 492):
1.  The  referent  of  a  pure  indexical  depends  on  the  context,  and  the  referent  of  a
demonstrative depends on the associated demonstration.
2. Indexicals, pure and demonstrative alike, are directly referential. (That is, the content
an indexical yields is its denotation, not a sense or other conceptual component.)
Kaplan argues that as utterances are features of the world and hence occur in time, it is
not possible to provide a semantic evaluation of utterances. We need instead to set the abstract
notion of a sentence-in-a-context, and to do this we need the notion of a context. Considering
that a context is a ‘possible occasion of use’ (1989: 494) of an expression, the agent turns out
to  be  an  abstract  feature  of  the  semantic  framework,  a  contextual  parameter  filling  the
argument of the character, giving us the referent of the indexical, and, as such, is logically
distinct from the notion of an utterer. But in the kaplanian framework the agent and the utterer
will always be identical and the referent of ‘I’ will always be the utterer. The same happens to
‘here’ and ‘now’; in each case the character of the indexical is a function from a contextual
parameter to the referent of the expression.
The LD states that a sentence is valid, and is a logical truth, iff it is true at every context
in every LD structure. An example of logical truth peculiar to indexicals is the sentence ‘I am
here now’, since no utterance can take place in a context whose agent is not in its location in
its time. In this paper I will argue that an appropriate semantics should not classify ‘I am here
now’ as a logical truth. In order to do so I will present examples of false utterances of ‘I am
here now’ and true utterances of ‘I am not here now’. Such examples will differ from the ones
present  in  the  well-known answering  machine and  post-it  puzzles (Sidelle  1991,  Predelli
1998a 1998b, Corazza et al. 2002).
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In the next section I sketch some of the examples found in the literature that challenges
the  traditional  view1.  In  section  2  I  give  some  examples  produced  in  Second  Life
environment, which cannot be handled correctly by evaluating the expression at issue with
respect to the traditional view. I conclude this paper by claiming that utterances produced in
virtual environments (VE) breaks with the logical truth status of ‘I am here now’ sentences.
1. Well-Known Puzzles
One needs only understand the meaning of [“I am here now”] to know that it cannot be uttered falsely
(Kaplan, 1989: 509).
There  are  two  well-known  puzzles  that  criticize  the  kaplanian  framework  for  the
indexes ‘now’ and ‘here’ (Sidelle 1991, Predelli 1998a, 2005) and a case where it’s claimed
that ‘I’ does not always refer to the agent of the context (Corazza et al, 2002), among other
variants2. The first two are metasemantic (Predelli, 2005) or pre-semantic (Perry 1997; Dodd
& Sweeney 2009) claims. They involve finding the suitable condition from where you can
start  doing  semantics,  e.g.  questions  about  in  virtue  of  what  does  a  given  term have its
semantic value (metasemantic) and about suitable associations between uttered sentences and
contexts (pre-semantic). The latter is rather a semantic claim, since it’s about the character of
‘I’, as we’ll see later.
Sidelle's paper makes the very simple point that utterances of ‘I am here now’ do not
always seem to be true in the trivial way that Kaplan had assumed. In particular, when you
call somebody with an answering machine it is possible to hear his voice saying, ‘I am not
here now’. In this case we seem to have the strong intuition that he is telling the truth if he
really isn't at home. If ‘I am not here now’ can be uttered truly, we need to allow contexts c*
1  Similar to what Stefano Predelli calls Simple-Minded View – “(...) the claim that utterances (or inscriptions)
are always correctly represented by means of indexes whose co-ordinates correspond in an obvious manner
to the parameters of the context of utterance (or inscription).” (Predelli, 2005: 41- 42). In a rough manner, the
referent of ‘I’ is ALWAYS the agent of the utterance, the referent of ‘here’ is ALWAYS the location of the
utterance and the referent of ‘now’ is ALWAYS the time of the utterance.
2  In a number of recent papers the Kaplanian framework for the logical truth status of ‘I am here now’ has
been criticized. Trying to sketch all of them would go beyond the main objective of this paper, that is to
present one simple new case.
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(class of improper contexts)3  into semantics such that the semantics will take <‘I am not here
now’,  c*> to a true proposition. When such contexts are paired with ‘I am here now’ the
semantics will take the pair to a contradiction, and thus ‘I am here now’ won’t be a logical
truth.
According  to  a  footnote  in  the  Demonstratives,  where  Kaplan  attributes  to  Keith
Donnellan, ‘our language might contain two forms of “now”: one for the time of production,
another for the time of audition’ (Kaplan, 1989, p. 491, fn. 12). That seems to be how Sidelle
deals with the Kaplan’s dictum that the referent of ‘now’ is the time of the utterance, i.e. the
utterance of an answering machine message occurs when the person records the message. In
fact Sidelle solves the puzzle arguing that the utterance takes place when the message is heard
by the listener, the decoding time, not when it is recorded, the encoding time (Fillmore 1975,
in Predelli  2005). The kaplanian framework is  left  untouched -  at  the time the answering
machine answers a call by reproducing the message ‘I am not here now’ a truth is expressed
and the characters of the indexicals remain the same. The referent of ‘now’ is the time the call
is  made  (the  triggering  of  the  answering  machine,  not  the  time of  the  recording).  So ‘I’
continues to refer to the agent a, who is not ‘here’ (l, the contextual parameter of location, the
place where the machine is located) ‘now’ (when the message is heard).
Predelli (1998a, 2005) presented a similar case using a post-it example. He tells us the
story of Jones, who suddenly decides to flee the country. Before leaving home at eight in the
morning, he writes a note to his wife, who will be back from work at five in the evening:
‘As you can see, I am not at home now. If you hurry, you’ll catch the evening flight to
Los Cabos. Meet me in six hours at the Cabo Real.’
The note doesn’t convey the false message that Jones is not at home at the time the note
was written. It also doesn’t request that his wife be at the hotel at 2p.m. (six hours from the
inscription). Predelli tells us that the correct interpretation of this example may be obtained on
the  basis  of  the  character  of  ‘I’,  ‘here’  and  ‘now’,  and  of  assumptions  pertaining  to  the
interpretative system’s structure, ‘if the index taken into consideration by the system contains
3  They would be contexts where a was not at l at t at w – Kaplan did not include such contexts in his 
semantics.
5
Investigação Filosófica: vol. 4, n. 2, artigo digital 1, 2013.
coordinates intended by the speaker as semantically relevant, even if distinct from the obvious
items within the context of utterance/inscription’ (Predelli 2005: 44). Predelli’s intentionalist
position is quite controversial and has been criticized in a number of articles (Corazza et al.
2002; Romdenh-Romluc 2002; Dodd & Sweenwy, 2009). He thinks agent’s intentions can
force the hearer/reader/receiver to look at a context of interpretation, since the index yielding
the  appropriate  outcome contains  as  its  temporal  coordinate  the  expected time  at  of  Mrs
Jones’s arrival, 5 p.m.,  rather than he time at which Jones wrote the note, 8 a.m. Predelli
argues that, with respect to this index, ‘now’ and ‘in six hours’ succeed in picking up 5 p.m.
and 11 p.m. according to their customary characters. According to him, temporal indexicals
are ambiguously anchored to either temporal coordinate, and the appropriate level of lexical
representation ought to distinguish between the ‘now’ of the time of production and the ‘now’
of the time of audition. Depending on the meaning with which indexicals are used, they may
end up picking up an individual a, location l, and time t, such that a may well fail to be in l at
t. Now imagine if Jones’s wife is unexpectedly delayed and arrives at home only at 8 p.m.
According to what Predelli calls the Simple Minded View, “now” in Jones’s note should pick
out the time of utterance, the time Mrs Jones reads the note (Donnellan’s  time of audition),
but Predelli argues that Mrs Jones, being aware that she was expected home at 5 p.m, will not
arrive at the hotel only at 2 a.m., but will meet her husband, as Jones expects, at 11 p.m. On
Predelli’s  account,  ‘now’ can be sensitive to an intentional context which may well differ
from the context of utterance.
The final case I’d like to consider before the next section was suggested by Corazza et
al. 2002 and involves the claim that ‘I’ does not always refer to the agent of the context. Their
proposal retain the account of the character of “I” as a function from agent to referent, pace
Kaplan, but reject the agent-utterer identity in problem cases. Understood along the lines of
something  like  a  Wittgensteinian  language  game  (2002,  p.  11,  fn.10),  the  contextual
parameter of the agent is conventionally given by the social or conventional setting in which
the utterance takes place.
For instance, in the answering machine case, the context in which ‘now’ is used changes
the time that the term refers to. If a friend sent you a postcard from India saying ‘It's snowing
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now in Manali’, the relevant time to be taken is the time those words were written. But in the
answering machine case when ‘now’ is heard, the relevant time to be considered is the exact
time of the message being played.
Corazza’s aim is to challenge the pure indexical’s status of ‘I’ in a slightly different
manner than Predelli’s intentionalist picture, which is claimed to be too strong – since too
much is left for the intentions of the agent. Let’s analyse Corazza’s post-it example:
‘Joe  is  not  in  his  office  one  day  and  Ben  notices  that  a  number  of  students  keep
approaching his door and knocking. They then stand around and look bemused for a while
before leaving. Taking pity on these poor souls wasting their time, Ben decides to attach his “I
am not here today” note to Joe’s door. The trick works; the students, instead of knocking and
waiting, take one look at the note and then leave’ (Corrazza et al. 2002, p. 5).
In this example it is clear that ‘here’ and ‘now’ refer to the day and place the note is
read, but in the case of ‘I’ things get a little bit more complicated. Joe didn’t write the note;
neither placed it on his door. Corazza suggests that it is implausible to suppose that Joe is the
utterer in this situation. If one takes into account kaplan’s character of ‘I’ (‘I’ refers to the
agent and the agent is identical to the utterer) it seems counter-intuitive that one can make
utterances  without  playing  no  role  in  it’s  production.  Instead  of  that,  it  is  claimed  that,
although  “I”  refers  to  Joe,  Joe  is  nevertheless  not  the  utterer.  Kaplan’s  account  of  the
character of “I” as a function from agent to referent is retained, but the agent– utterer identity
is rejected.
In a recent paper (Dodd & Sweeney 2009) this position is criticized4 with the support of
three elements (stages) of utterance production. In STAGE 1 the agent of the context kicks the
mechanism of production into action (time, location = t1, l1). In STAGE 2 the mechanism of
production works towards its end, namely producing a sentence tokening. In STAGE 3 the
sentence is tokened, and the agent’s message is now broadcast to her audience (time, location
= t2, l2). In the post-it example above, Dodd and Sweeney argue that when using the personal
indexical ‘I’, a potential  agent other than the referent can only be involved as part of the
4  Dodd and Sweeney defend Kaplan’s claim that ‘I’ is a pure indexical, however they criticize the claim that ‘I
am here now’ is a logical truth as they allow ‘improper contexts’ to be part of their semantics.
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mechanism of communication. When Ben places the ‘I am not here today’ note on Joe’s door
he is communicating something, but it is argued that there is no agent of the context and that
the proposition is left incomplete. Joe cannot be the agent since Ben acted completely on his
own  initiative.  ‘I’  doesn’t  refer  in  this  case.  In  Perry’s  (2003)  terminology,  there  is  no
referential content.
2. Virtual Environments
My suggestion is that in virtual environments, e.g. Second Life, one has to give up the
pure indexical status of ‘here’, but the pure indexical status of ‘I’ is preserved even if ‘I’
refers to an avatar. ‘Now’ is not a worry in the virtual environments cases I present since the
examples involve real time situations. The lag, the delay between a keyboard inscription (or a
microphone utterance) and its tokening is regarded as a [unfortunate] constituent part, as a
side effect of the mechanism of production, pace Dodd and Sweeney 2009.
Here  is  the  scenario.  In  Second  Life  you  can  be  whoever  you  want  (with  the
programming limitations in mind), you can fly, change gender, change shape, size, the colour
of your skin, teleport and build your own virtual world parcel. That’s great when you think of
entertainment, the enormous possibilities of gaming, fictional characters development, fantasy
graphics and use of creative content. But all these have to do with the eye-candy of Second
Life. The  virtual world  is not about the stuff you actually see, the things you can build are
only symbols  that serve as a kind of catalyst  for the formation of social  groups (Ludlow
2009). There are thousands of residents who spend long hours, sometimes too much of their
time  inside  the  Second Life  environment.  It’s  the  people  who work there,  programmers,
designers, architects, teachers, people who run business, who participate in learning projects,
meetings and don’t take that environment only as a simple communication medium, but as a
new geographical  situ  (Ondrejka  2007).  More  than  working towards  producing sentences
tokenings,  virtual  worlds  are  meant  to  be  powerful  environments  that  can  dramatically
improve collaboration and interaction between agents immersed in a huge 3D environment.
This new situ overcomes distances bypassing traditional geographical constraints.
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Example (1):
I met professor Peter Ludlow in a conference at Universidade Federal do Rio do Janeiro
and we chat about Second Life. We exchanged our Second Life resident names - Urizenus
Skalar (professor Peter Ludlow) and Bardo Dejavu (me) - and made plans to meet in SL to
share some thoughts about indexicals in virtual environments. Three days later I logged in
from Rio at 15:35 p.m., as well as professor Ludlow at 13:30 p.m. from New York. Since we
are friends in SL we can see each other status in our friends list, hence when I log in he might
be aware (if he searches) that I’m logged in and vice-versa. As I was five minutes late he was
the one who received the message that I’ve logged in. He sent me a text message ‘I am here
now’ and offered me a teleportation to the location where he actually were. As soon as the
teleportation was complete something happened at his [real]5 house – the pizza was burning in
the oven – and he had to leave for a moment to rescue his lunch, changing his status message
to ‘away’6. Curiously Ludlow programmed his status to display ‘I am not here now’ instead of
‘away’. So, after the teleportation, when I finally reached the parcel of the virtual environment
he was supposed to be I saw his avatar sleeping with the status message upon his head ‘I am
not here now’.
Case (1): ‘Here’ is not a pure indexical.
Considering the traditional view - that the utterer and the agent are always the same -
and considering the avatar as a fictional character, as a medium, part of the mechanism of
production, when Ludlow produced ‘I am not here now’ in SL a truth was expressed. In this
case ‘I’ refers to professor Peter Ludlow, ‘now’ to the exact moment that I read the message,
but ‘here’ is not the location from where he uttered the message (New York). ‘Here’ refers to
a 3D parcel inside huge servers in Texas rendered in a proper display apparatus. If I was
teleported to the wrong parcel I couldn’t read the message. ‘Here’ is not a pure indexical, the
contextual location at the time of the utterance is not the same as the location of the utterer.
5  As opposed to ‘virtual’.
6  One can set status messages to avatars, if you’re ‘away’ means you’re still logged into your account but not
present at the moment.
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One possible objection is to affirm that, when Ludlow left the message ‘I am not here
now’ he meant ‘not behind the computer’, simply because he run for his pizza. This objection
only reinforces that ‘I am here now’ is not a logical truth, because, kept the purity of the
indexical  ‘here’ – the referent  of ‘here’ is  always the location of the utterance -  he truly
uttered ‘I am not here now’ while keeping the kaplanian framework intact, but that’s not what
it’s claimed. The example above was produced on purpose to force this objection. Instead of
the burning pizza, Ludlow could simply be tired of waiting and just set his status as away (‘I
am not here now’), while still sat on his chair, in front of the computer screen. Would this be a
false  proposition?  I  don’t  think  so,  simply  because  ‘here’  doesn’t  mean  ‘in  front  of  the
computer’ in this case.
It is important to notice the dual use of ‘here’ – pure indexical (here) vs. demonstrative
(dthat[α]). As suggested by Colterjohn and MacIntosh (1987), ‘here’ may pick up a location
distinct from where the speaker happens to be. According to their suggestion one can say: ‘I
am here now, but tomorrow I’ll be here’ (pointing to Amsterdam on a map). In their view,
‘here’  operates  as  a  demonstrative  accompanied  by  a  ‘proxy  finger’.  In  our  case  ‘here’
operates as a demonstrative accompanied by pixels and hyperlinks.
Example (2):
Urizenus Skalar,  a famous journalist  from the Second Life Herald, is going to meet
Bardo Dejavu, a cyberpunk resident, for an interview about the constant raise of rental prices
in SL. But when Skalar teleported to Bardo’s house he noted that Bardo had already logged
off and left a message on his door - ‘I am not here now’.
Case (2): ‘Here’ is not a pure indexical, neither is ‘I’?
‘Here’ refers to the 3D location in the SL parcel, ‘now’ refers to the time Skalar reads
the status message, but in this case it is not clear that ‘I’ refers to me, the utterer. One can
argue that in this case ‘I’ refers to Bardo and that Bardo is more than a mere mechanism of
production. In this case Bardo is the agent  a and the agent is different from the uterrer. He
represents  the  ‘Avatar’  in  the  strong  sense  of  the  term,  a  form of  self,  representing  the
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electronic embodiment of the user. Note that this is not a naïve assumption. The example
above is different from example (1) because Bardo is not ‘away’; the avatar is not ‘sleeping’
with a message upon his head conveying the information that the gamer, the person behind
the computer is not available at that moment. The message is clear; it states that the avatar is
not there.
Is this case like Corazza’s post-it case but in cyberspace? Is it plausible to affirm that
there are cases where this kind of embodiment allows a different index, which constitutes
improper contexts with respect to ‘I’? My answer is no.
In third person virtual environments like SL the avatar works as a rich mechanism of
production, an IT augmented version of ‘I’, a kind of costume to whatever social role you
play. The richest and complex it might be, it is still ‘you’ talking, typing, flying, logging off.
If the avatar is the graphical representation of a user, the utterer-agent identity is kept, hence
‘I’ is still a pure indexical. The word ‘I’ has as the contextual parameter the agent, that is the
utterer, who is speaking / typing at the encoding moment. It is plausible to assume that there
are many cases in which a SL resident tells another resident ‘I am here now’ he doesn’t mean
‘at  home,  in  front  of  my computer,  speaking through the  microphone’.  In  these cases he
obviously  means  ‘in  this  parcel  of  this  virtual  environment’.  On  the  other  hand  it  is
particularly  implausible  to  assume that  in  these  cases  ‘I’  doesn’t  refer,  ultimately,  to  the
person  behind  the  computer,  even  if  it’s  through  a  kind  of  alter  ego  or  fantastic
representation7.
Conclusion
The notion that a speaker is at the location of her utterance when she is producing it is
widely accepted. Given the notion that ‘I’, ‘here’ and ‘now’ refer to the utterer, the place and
the location at which the utterance takes place, it follows that sentences such as ‘I am here
now’ are always truly utterable. We saw that there are some cases that seem to cast doubt on
the notion that a speaker is always at the place of the utterance when the utterance occurs.
These cases appeal to improper contexts, that is, indexes i such that ia is not in il, at it  and iw.
7  Avatars range from lifelike humans to more fanciful robots, animals, and mythical creatures.
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The first two cases concern the status of pure indexicality of ‘now’ and ‘here’, the third of ‘I’.
As Dodd & Sweeney 2009 I also think that Corazza  et al. 2002 fails to criticize the purity
status of the indexical ‘I’. Finally, I have presented examples that criticize the logical truth
status of ‘I am here now’ in virtual environments. In both cases it is clear that at least ‘here’ is
not a pure indexical. It is also showed that there is a sense in which we can say that ‘I’ refers
to an avatar,  but it  is not a problem since,  by definition,  the avatar always represents the
person behind the computer. Following Putnam (1973) I think that the extension of our terms
depends upon the actual nature of the particular things that serve as paradigms.  Semantic
theories  must  encompass  contributions  of  society  and,  by examining  the  social  nature  of
virtual  environments,  it’s  plausible [in some cases] to shift  the use of the indexical  word
‘here’ to refer to a virtual space where avatars interact, where ‘I’ [using an avatar to represent
me] am ‘here’ [in a VE] ‘now’ [at the moment the sentence is tokened].
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